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Abstract
Public good attributes that are correlated with protest beliefs but not separable from the good's
value, would affect stated preference estimates of the WTP for the public good. Survey data
collected to value a program to prevent ecosystem losses on Nevada rangelands, where the
majority of land is publicly owned and managed, reveal more than half of the respondents
exhibiting some protest belief. Of these, about 60% voted 'yes' to some nonzero bid amount. By
treating protest beliefs and opposition to the proposed program as separate concepts, we
systematically analyze their determinants and impacts on WTP. In this framework, people with
protest beliefs may or may not vote 'no' to all bids and people may, without being protesters,
answer 'no' to all dollar amounts. Multinomial logit regression results suggest that factors
motivating people to protest and/or oppose the proposed program are so diverse that a single
model does not provide a good fit. We estimate nested models and conclude that different
underlying processes determine WTP for "protesters" ($34.02) and "non-protesters" ($69.56).
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Willingness to Pay Estimation When Protest Beliefs are Not Separable from the Public
Good Definition
By Kimberly Rollins, M.D.R. Evans, Mimako Kobayashi, and Anita Castledine
Introduction
Protest responses to stated preference questions have traditionally been treated as outliers to
be identified and eliminated from data collected to estimate willingness to pay (WTP). The
earliest literature identified a protest response as a ‘no’ to an extremely low dollar amount, or a
‘yes’ to an extremely high amount. However, in some circumstances a ‘no’ response to a very
low bid, including $0, is not necessarily a protest response, but a genuine indication of a zero or
negative WTP (or willingness to accept compensation). The use of sets of follow-up questions
asking respondents why they voted ‘no’ has became standard practice to identify respondents
who hold protest beliefs as opposed to genuine ‘no’ responses. These questions typically query
the respondent about (a) their attitudes toward the payment vehicle (e.g. “I am opposed to new
taxes”), (b) paying for a public good (“somebody else should pay” or “I don’t believe in placing
a dollar value on this good”), (c) trust in the agency or organization that would hypothetically
provide the good (“I don’t trust the government to use my contribution for the intended
purpose”), and (d) other beliefs that affect the likelihood of a ‘no’ response but that are
associated less with their preferences for the good itself than with the methods that are used to
elicit preferences.
Standardization of a set of protest questions and protocol has not occurred, in part because
the non-market goods and payment vehicles used in preference elicitation are highly variable.
As an alternative to adopting a standard protocol, some authors advocate using open-ended
questions identify protest responses (Bateman et al. 1999). Dziegielewska and Mendelsohn
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(2007) propose a method that combines several approaches to identify protestors: they identify
protesters as respondents who (a) vote ‘no’ to all dichotomous choice bid amounts, (b) indicate a
$0 WTP on open-ended follow-up questions, and also (c) hold protest beliefs. The majority of
the published literature in this area is similarly concerned with methods to identify protest
responses in order to justify eliminating outliers from an analysis.
However, a number of authors point out that, in identifying protesters solely for the purpose
of deleting outliers, we lose information that is important for non-market valuation as well as
compromising our capacity to make inferences to the general population. Jorgensen and Syme
(2000) illustrate that interdependence among the types of beliefs that people hold can lead to
biased WTP estimates if observations from respondents with one type of belief are deleted from
an analysis but those of the other type are not deleted. They show that some people who are
willing to pay also hold protest beliefs, but would not be identified as protest respondents if the
criteria included voting ‘no’ to all dollar amounts. They conclude that a more thorough analysis
of protest beliefs and interdependencies among beliefs held by respondents is necessary for
achieving a consistent method of identifying and treating protesters in an analysis.
Furthermore, we claim that in many circumstances public goods have attributes that are not
easily separable from the flows and services provided such as program delivery and financing,
but that are correlated with protest beliefs such as opposition to new taxes or distrust of
government.

In these cases, survey designs may be limited in their ability to control for

attributes that trigger protest responses. If people with protest beliefs define the good in question
differently from non-protesters, then the underlying preferences and the distributions for WTP
may also be different, therefore making the WTP estimates difficult to interpret. In these
circumstances, a large proportion of the population may exhibit protest beliefs. Eliminating
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protest responses would result in loss of policy relevant information, while using both protesters’
and non-protesters’ WTP estimates would lead to better informed policy decisions.
In this paper, we use survey data collected to value a program to prevent further ecosystem
losses from invasive species and wildfire on Great Basin rangelands in Nevada, where the vast
majority of the land is publicly owned and managed. Historically there has been tension between
the private citizens and the federal land management agencies. It is therefore not surprising that
more than half of the respondents exhibited some protest belief. Given that the payment vehicle
for the proposed program was taxation and that the most popular protest reasons were distrust of
government and weariness of paying taxes, we hypothesize that many of those with protest
beliefs likely evaluated, instead of a pure ecosystem, a composite good “ecosystem managed by
a public agency.” Appropriate definition of protest is especially important for this dataset
because, of those with protest beliefs, about 60% voted ‘yes’ to some non-zero bid amount. As a
result, if we were to apply the conventional protest definition, we would throw out more than a
fifth of the survey responses from the analysis as outliers, while pooling those with protest
beliefs and those without. If that is the case, WTP estimates for a pooled sample would be
biased downward and would not be appropriate to use as society’s valuation of the ecosystem.
Meyerhoff and Liebe (2006) focus on explaining the underlying motives for protest beliefs
held by respondents to contingent valuation questionnaires. They use six questions for all
respondents, not just people who voted ‘no’ for all dollar amounts, to identify protest
respondents, distinguish among types of protest beliefs, and analyze how protest beliefs
influence the decision to pay and the amount that protesters are willing to pay to support a public
program. Respondents indicate agreement or disagreement on a 5-point Likert scale, from which
a protest index is constructed. They use the protest index as the dependent variable in a
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regression with demographic, attitudinal and economic variables as predictors to identify
motivations for protest beliefs. They used the same independent variables in regressions to
estimate WTP. While they show that people with protest beliefs behave differently in their WTP
responses, they do not estimate separate models for protest and non-protest respondents. Instead,
their constructed protest index variable is used to indicate strength of protest, and variables that
indicate motivations for protesting are included in regressions. They find that most respondents
who are willing to pay for the public good also hold protest beliefs, and that WTP is negatively
correlated with the strength of protest belief. However, the overall fit for their WTP models is
quite weak. If the underlying distributions for WTP are different for respondents with different
protest reasons or strengths, then separate models, or allowing parameters to vary by protest
belief, may have resulted in an improved fit, which is the approach used in this paper.
Many authors including Dziegielewska and Mendelsohn (2007) discuss the difficulty in
coming up with a standard protocol for identifying protest responses. The problem may be that a
protest response is not necessarily a discretely measured item. It may be that protest beliefs are
held in some form by most people and have some effect on WTP responses. Therefore, we
propose treating protesting (holding protest beliefs) and opposing (WTP < 0) a proposed public
program as separate concepts, so as to systematically analyze their determinants and their
impacts on WTP estimates. In this framework, people with protest beliefs may or may not vote
‘no’ to all bids and people may, without being protesters, answer ‘no’ to all dollar amounts
because they believe the outcome would leave them worse off. We assume those who have no
value for the proposed policy (i.e. indifferent respondents or WTP = 0) to be included in the
“non-opposer” (WTP ≥ 0) category.
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The first set of analyses addresses on the factors that motivate people to protest and/or
oppose the proposed program. Multinomial logit regression results suggest that the sample is so
diverse that a single model does not provide a good fit. To generate more accurate predictions
on the probabilities of protesting and opposing, a different model specification would be required
for each subsample.

Second, to test whether people with protest beliefs have different

underlying processes that determine WTP than those without protest beliefs, we estimate nested
models for “protesters” and “non-protesters” as group, rather than treating protesting as a
continuous variable as in Meyerhoff and Liebe (2006). The statistical test suggests that the two
groups of respondents have different WTP distributions. The result also suggests that the use of
standard protest belief follow-up questions can successfully identify subsets of respondents
whose strength of belief is different enough to affect WTP distribution.
Background, Survey Design, and Data
This paper provides valuation estimates for preventative and restorative land management
programs in the Great Basin that would arrest the accelerated wildfire cycle due to invasion of
annual weeds. The sagebrush steppe of the United States Great Basin occupies 100 million acres
of western high desert, provides habitat for more than 300 species of wildlife, supports one of the
nation’s fastest growing human populations, and is the primary forage base for the western
livestock industry (Knick et al. 2003). While these lands provide for less than 3 percent of the
nation’s cattle and sheep feed, grazing is a key component of local rural economies and the
cultural identity of the region (Hess and Holechek 1995). This ecosystem is also severely
ecologically stressed, with the Nature Conservancy recently ranking it as the third most
endangered in the United States (Stein et al. 2000; Noss et al. 1995). Half has been lost to
invasive annual grasses, primarily cheatgrass (Bromus tectorum), which have altered fire regimes
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in the region, causing an escalating cycle of increasingly severe and frequent wildfire (Whisenant
1990; Miller and Tausch 2001). Scientific evidence suggests that unless steps are taken to
intervene, the accelerating cheatgrass/wildfire cycle will result in irreversible shifts in ecosystem
dynamics that would compromise the ability of the land to support native wildlife and plants and
affect the biological and economic stability of the Great Basin (BLM 1999, 2000; Pellant,
Abbey, and Karl 2004; Young et al. 1987; Devine 1993). This observation motivates our study
on the valuation of Great Basin ecosystem protection.
Data were collected through a 2005 mail survey of Nevada residents, using survey methods
based on Dillman (2000). Focus groups, questionnaire development and pretesting proceeded
through spring and summer of 2005. Responses were analyzed during one-on-one interviews
with pretest respondents, during group sessions, and afterward by the researchers. Question
wording was reviewed for comprehension and interpretation. These results are based on the
resulting pilot survey and are part of a larger body of related survey work in the Great Basin.
The questionnaire collected data necessary to estimate willingness to pay (WTP) for
vegetation management programs to protect ecosystem-derived values. Questions were asked
about respondents’ demographic characteristics, how they benefit from Great Basin lands, their
beliefs and attitudes regarding the effects of invasive annual grasses and wildfire on these lands,
and value of land management practices that target invasive grasses and wildfire. A private firm
supplied 2,125 addresses for the survey.

One thousand addresses were generated to be

representative of the state of Nevada overall, based on the 2000 census. Since a high proportion
of the state population is in the Las Vegas and Reno metropolitan areas (Clark and Washoe
Counties), an additional 1,125 addresses were drawn from rural counties to perform analysis
comparing rural and urban populations. The first mailing was conducted during mid-October,
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2005.

Follow-up postcards were sent out to non-respondents.

A second mailing to non-

respondents was implemented during the first week of February, 2006, after the holiday season.
Of 2,125 surveys sent out, 178 were undeliverable (no forwarding addresses available) and 576
completed surveys were returned for a statewide response rate of 30%. Response rates tended to
be higher in rural counties, so the county-weighted average (37%) is higher than the statewide
average. Eighteen surveys were eventually omitted from the valuation analysis because they
included inconsistent responses (i.e. a ‘no’ to a bid amount that was lower than one with a ‘yes’
response from the same respondent).
An experimental design included five survey versions, assigned randomly to participants, to
measure effects of providing respondents with additional information, preemptive versus
restoration treatment scenarios, and multiple contingent valuation bid formats (Table 1). The
contingent valuation question is presented in the context of one of two treatment scenarios. The
prevent loss (PL) scenario states that the numbers of wildfires in Nevada are expected to double
over the next five years due to the continued spread of cheatgrass, increasing the risk of
irreversibly losing lands that could support native vegetation.

In this case, the proposed

vegetation management program would prevent a negative change from the status quo. The
obtain gain (OG) scenario states that the proposed vegetation management program would be
restorative and thereby reduce the number of wildfires throughout Nevada by half (a positive
change). Thus the OG scenario measures willingness to pay to improve the status quo (obtain a
positive change relative to the status quo). The two versions of the program proposal are
provided in an Appendix. Both scenarios state that the program would be funded through a
dedicated tax. Respondents were asked how they would vote in a referendum to implement the
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vegetation management program, if passage would cost each household a specific amount every
year for the foreseeable future.
Table 1. Questionnaire Versions
Version Information Treatment scenario
PLSi
with
Prevent loss (PL)
PLDi
with
Prevent loss (PL)
PLMi
with
Prevent loss (PL)
OGMi
with
Obtain gain (OG)
OGM
without
Obtain gain (OG)
(Total)

Bid format
Responses
$0, $1, and 1 other (S)
109
$0, $1, and 2 others (D)
84
$0, $1, and 7 others (M)
75
$0, $1, and 7 others (M)
104
$0, $1, and 7 others (M)
186
558

Respondents were presented with three to nine bid amounts. Three discrete choice CVM
formats were employed. All versions included the bid amounts $0 and $1. A “single-bid” (S)
version included one additional randomly assigned bid amount from the bid set $12, $31, $52,
$83, $114, $157, and $282. The “double-bid” (D) version included two additional randomly
assigned bid amounts from the same bid set. The “multiple-bid” (M) version included all bid
amounts, listed in ascending order. The “no cost” ($0 bid) and the $1 bid amounts are included
to separate those who are opposed to the proposed program and would vote against it even if it
cost them nothing, from those who are in favor of the proposal but are unwilling or unable to pay
for it.

Following Alberini et al (2003) and Welch and Poe (1998) all versions used

polychotomous choice response options including ‘definitely no,’ ‘probably no,’ ‘probably yes,’
‘definitely yes,’ and ‘not sure,’ allowing respondents to indicate qualitative levels of
uncertainty. 1
We included with the survey a 2-page information sheet about cheatgrass, increasing wildfire
suppression costs, the accelerating fire cycle and resulting irreversible ecosystem losses. This
information sheet was omitted from a sub-sample of the multiple-bid Obtain Gain versions
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(OGM) in order to investigate the influence of information provision on WTP for fuel
management programs.
Table 2 summarizes demographic, and survey design variables generated from the data that
are used in all models, as well as variables that indicate respondents’ perceptions of 1) the
importance of specific resources and services provided by Nevada’s rangelands, 2) what
threatens them, 3) what they believe management priorities should be, and 4) attitudes toward
management methods. Descriptions and measurement units listed in Table 2 are self-explanatory.
Identifying Protesters
A battery of questions asking why respondents voted the way that they did to valuation
proposals was included in the questionnaire to identify protest responses. A protest response is
defined as one motivated at least in part by attitudes that are not directly related to the good in
question. Respondents are coded as “protesters” if they checked any of the following four
reasons for voting ‘no’ at least once to any dollar bid amount: “I don’t trust the government to
use my taxes wisely,” “I already pay too much in taxes,” “I object to the way the question was
asked,” or “I feel that I don’t have enough information.” Opposition to the program is defined as
not having answered ‘definitely yes’ to the $0 bid. Because of the design of the polychotomous
multiple question format, most respondents answered ‘no’ to at least one of the higher bid
amounts, even if they had answered ‘yes’ to lower bid amounts. This design resulted in a
possibility of respondents who are “protester•non-opposers” who express protest beliefs but are
willing to pay a non-negative amount.
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Table 2. Variables Describing Bid Responses, Demographics, and Survey Versions
Variable

Definition

Mean

Bid
Vs
Vd
Vm
OG
Info
Income
Age
Educ
Yrs_NV
Job_ag
Job_lndscp
Job_mine
Job_constr/mfn
Job_trade
Job_wtrmgnt
Job_othutil
Job_health
Job_nrsci
Job_ed
Job_ent
Job_recr
Job_publnds
Job_admin
Job_fire
Srt
Lrt
Activity
Import_airwat
Threat_policy
Threat_wldhrse
Threat_nonnat
Pri_frpvt
dmeth_herb
dmthd_nogrz
dmthd_prsfir
dmthd_prsgrz

Dollar amount presented to respondent
1 = single bid questionnaire version; 0 otherwise
1 = double bid questionnaire version; 0 otherwise
1 = multiple bid questionnaire version; 0 otherwise
Scenario: 1 = restoration (obtain gain); 0 = prevent loss
1 = information sheet provided; 0 = no information sheet
Household annual income in $1000’s
Age of respondent
Number of years of schooling completed
Number of years lived in Nevada
1 = ranching or agriculture; else = 0
1 = landscaping; else = 0
1 = mining; else = 0
1 = construction or manufacturing; else = 0
1 = wholesale or retail trade; else = 0
1 = water resources management; else = 0
1 = utilities (other than water); else = 0
1 = healthcare; else = 0
1 = natural resource / environmental sciences; else = 0
1 = education/academia; else = 0
1 = arts, entertainment, hotel, food services; else = 0
1 = outdoor recreation & tourism; else = 0
1 = public land management; else = 0
1 = public admin (not land & water resources); else = 0
1 = firefighting; else = 0
1= lives in small rural town; else = 0
1= lives in large rural town; else = 0
Number times engaged in activities on rangelands per year
Mean response to importance of air & water quality (1 to 4)
1 = land use policies threaten rangelands; else = 0
1 = wild horses threaten Nevada’s rangelands; else = 0
1 = seeding w/ non-natives threaten rangelands; else = 0
Importance of wildfire prevention as a mgmnt priority (1-4)
1 = Using herbicides not appropriate; else = 0
1 = Excluding grazing animals not appropriate; else = 0
1 = Prescribed fire not appropriate; else = 0
1 = Prescribed grazing not appropriate; else = 0
1 = Agree that livestock grazing should be managed for
vegetation priorities; else = 0
1 = Agree that rangeland fires should be stopped only when

65.612
0.195
0.151
0.654
0.520
0.667
71.085
52.135
14.254
20.971
0.075
0.020
0.152
0.097
0.075
0.023
0.034
0.088
0.036
0.100
0.048
0.043
0.027
0.016
0.020
0.373
0.140
1.744
3.555
0.610
0.410
0.554
3.049
0.249
0.405
0.063
0.061

St.
Dev.
27.153
0.397
0.358
0.476
0.500
0.472
51.950
14.356
2.469
12.001
0.264
0.139
0.360
0.296
0.264
0.151
0.182
0.283
0.186
0.301
0.215
0.203
0.162
0.126
0.139
0.484
0.347
1.320
0.680
0.488
0.492
0.498
0.960
0.433
0.491
0.243
0.240

0.762

0.426

0.448

0.498

dgrzveg
dfiresupp
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they threaten human life; 0 = otherwise

Because only those who answered ‘no’ to any bid were asked to answer follow-up questions,
protest attitudes of those who answered ‘yes’ to all bids could not be determined. There were 35
responses with ‘definitely yes’ to all bids, of which one answered the follow-up question and was
coded as a protester. The other 34 respondents were assigned a missing value for the protest
dummy variable. Of the 524 respondents with a value for the protest variable, 286 (55%)
exhibited some protest beliefs (Table 3). Distrust of government was the most popular reason for
protest, followed by already paying too much in taxes and then by insufficient information.
Proportionately more protesters are found among opposers than among non-opposers, but a
substantial 51% of non-opposers are also protesters. No clear pattern is observed for differences
in protest reasons between opposers and non-opposers.
Table 3. Protesting and Opposing

Protester (‘yes’ to at least one question)
of which:
I don’t trust the government
I already pay too much in taxes
I object to the way the question was asked
I don’t have enough information
Non-protester
Total

Opposer
(WTP < 0)
117 (60%)
77
64
21
57

(66%)
(55%)
(18%)
(49%)

Non-opposer
Total
(WTP ≥ 0)
169 (51%) 286 (55%)
116
93
21
53

(69%)
(55%)
(12%)
(31%)

193
157
42
110

(67%)
(55%)
(15%)
(38%)

77 (40%) 161 (49%) 238 (45%)
194 (100%) 330 (100%) 524 (100%)

We assume that protest attitudes are a characteristic of the individual that originates from his
or her beliefs. If any of the questionnaire design variables influenced a respondent’s propensity
to be a protester, we would need to proceed with caution. Of particular concern is whether
demonstration of protest attitude was affected by whether respondents were given PL (prevent
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losses) or OG (obtain gain) version of questionnaire. Whether or not the additional 2-page
information was offered also potentially affect propensity to express protest attitudes.
To test for potential selection bias introduced by survey designs, probit regressions were run
to estimate protest probabilities using questionnaire design variables as explanatory variables for
appropriate subsamples. The estimation results (not shown in table) indicate that whether a
respondent received a PL or OG version or whether a respondent received additional information
did not affect protest probability. On the other hand, we found that the bid structure may have
affected protest answers: a higher protest probability was observed among respondents with
questionnaire that contained higher dollar bid amounts on average. However, the effect was
insignificant when the same model was run only for PL version recipients (the OG version
contains no variation in bid structure). Thus, it is likely that bid structure did not affect protest
answers but, when PL and OG version respondents are pooled, the data tend to show some
spurious relation. This result will be accounted for in the subsequent analyses.
Probabilities of Protesting and Opposing
The next model predicts the probability a respondent will be one of the four types: 1)
protester•opposer, 2) non-protester•opposer, 3) protester•non-opposer, and 4) non-protester•nonopposer. The model explores which individual characteristics are associated with protest beliefs
and what motivates people to oppose or support programs to protect rangeland ecosystems. A
multinomial logit regression was applied to the dataset using the “non-protester•non-opposer”
type as the base outcome. In this model, observations with missing protest information were
dropped.
Non-opposers are defined as those individuals who answered ‘definitely yes’ to $0; that is,
they are certain that they would support or be indifferent to the program if it would cost their
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household nothing. If we define indifferent respondents as those who answered ‘definitely yes’
to $0 but not to $1 bid, there were 42 such respondents. Non-opposers are assumed to be “in the
market” for the proposed efforts to protect rangeland ecosystems in principle, but they may still
hold protest beliefs.
Any other response to $0 is assumed to indicate either a perceived utility loss from adoption
of the proposed program or a protest response. Some respondents may oppose because they
expect to be negatively affected by certain features of a vegetation management program. The
description of the treatments include all of the methods currently being used in the Great Basin
today for vegetation management, including herbicides that target invasive annuals, prescribed
burning, grazing prohibitions, and planting non-native grasses that can out-compete invasive
annuals more effectively than native species. While all of these methods are used because they
have been proven effective in a variety of circumstances, there are potential costs and risks
associated with them as well. We expect that respondents who believe that the expected net
effect of a program to them personally would leave them worse off would indicate opposition to
the program even if it cost them $0. If these respondents did not indicate a protest reason for
their answer, then we consider these as legitimate indications of negative WTP for the programs.
Many of the demographic and attitudinal variables are collinear. Thus, model selection
focused on removing insignificant and collinear variables from the regression while keeping the
variables we believe affect probabilities of protesting and opposing. Regression results are
summarized in Table 4, and their interpretations are the following. Since the base outcome is
non-protester•non-opposer, column (1) reveals variables that affect the probability of protesting
and opposing simultaneously. Column (2) represents how the explanatory variables affect nonprotester•opposer probability relative to non-protester•non-opposer probability, that is, they show
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what makes an individual more likely to oppose when he or she is a non-protester. Similarly,
column (3) represents the effect of the variables on probability of protesting when an individual
is a non-opposer.

Upon inspection of coefficients and standard errors, it appears that the

underlying behavioral motivations for protesting and opposing are very different among the three
groups (indicated by columns 1 through 3).
Nevada’s population is such that residents who live in metropolitan areas tend to be less
conservative than their rural counterparts. Nevadans who live in rural towns and isolated rural
areas tend to be much more conservative and less likely to trust government and support new
government programs. For these reasons, we might expect that the probability of being a
protester would be higher for rural residents relative to the rest of the population. On the other
hand, we can surmise that respondents from large rural towns are more likely to live in
communities most affected by exotic weed invasions and accelerating fire cycles. For this
reason, they may be more likely to understand the proposed vegetation management programs,
how they work and how they may affect residents’ quality of life. We can surmise that these
respondents are more likely to respond to the specific features of the good in question (programs
to affect accelerating fire cycles) rather than to their held beliefs about trust in government or tax
rates. As for opposition to the proposed programs, for the reasons outlined above, residents of
large rural communities may be less likely to oppose such a program.
Model results indicate that, relative to the base case, the probabilities of being a nonprotester•opposer (column 2) and protester•non-opposer (column 3) individually are lower for
residents in large rural towns. These results are consistent with our discussion above. However,
the coefficient for large rural town residence (Lrt) is not significant for the probability of being
both an opposer and a protester (column 1). The result suggests that the underlying motivations
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[Table 4. Estimation Results for Probability of Protesting and Opposing (Multinomial
Logit)
(1)
Protester
Opposer

(2)
Non-protester
Opposer

(3)
Protester
Non-opposer

Coeff

s.e.

Coeff

s.e.

Coeff

s.e.

Educ
Age
Job_ag
Job_trade
Job_ed
Job_recr
Srt
Lrt
Activity
Import_airwat
Threat_policy
Threat_wldhrse
Threat_non-nat
Pri_frpvt
dmthd_nogrz
dmthd_prsgrz
dmthd_prsfir
dmeth_herb
dgrzveg
dfiresupp
Vs
Vd
OG
Info
cons

-0.164***
0.003
1.148**
0.522
-0.387
-1.261*
0.348
0.542
-0.259**
-0.270
-0.268
0.262
0.071
-0.319**
0.253
0.248
1.021
-0.070
-0.901***
0.241
-0.766
-0.835*
-0.478
-0.619
5.124***

0.059
0.010
0.499
0.507
0.524
0.723
0.312
0.364
0.114
0.216
0.281
0.282
0.280
0.144
0.276
0.701
0.622
0.329
0.332
0.273
0.480
0.500
0.487
0.392
1.440

-0.173**
0.000
0.684
1.015*
-1.165
-0.605
0.299
-1.032*
0.099
-0.035
-0.351
0.737**
-0.138
0.056
-0.507
1.069
0.337
0.333
-1.339***
0.576*
-1.080**
-1.486**
-0.455
-0.136
2.628

0.073
0.012
0.584
0.536
0.811
0.676
0.346
0.608
0.120
0.273
0.342
0.332
0.333
0.181
0.341
0.657
0.769
0.367
0.385
0.325
0.552
0.615
0.537
0.444
1.768

-0.119**
-0.016*
-0.208
-0.028
0.516
-1.117*
0.361
-0.661*
0.072
-0.296
0.289
0.017
0.307
-0.097
0.045
0.813
0.639
-0.289
-0.762**
0.129
-1.058**
-0.917**
-0.283
-0.370
4.527***

0.051
0.009
0.546
0.519
0.372
0.623
0.263
0.375
0.093
0.201
0.254
0.246
0.246
0.132
0.245
0.565
0.598
0.292
0.310
0.241
0.426
0.440
0.414
0.330
1.304

Log likelihood
Observations
Pseudo R2

-600.257
515
0.116

Notes: Significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 are denoted by three, two, and one asterisks (***, **, *), respectively.
Base outcome is non-protester•non-opposer.
Observations with missing protest information are dropped.
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by large rural town residents for protest and opposition voting may be very different, so that
the multinomial logit picks these up through the coefficients that isolate the individual effects but
not when they are combined.
We can surmise that Nevada residents involved in agriculture are likely to be aware that
vegetation management treatments associated with rangeland restoration and prevention of
exotic weed invasion typically involve livestock grazing prohibitions that can have negative
effects on ranching income. They are thus more likely to be opposers. If it can be assumed that
ranchers follow similar demographic patterns to others living in rural Nevada, we would expect
these respondents to be more conservative and more likely to hold protestor beliefs regarding
government distrust and taxation. As expected, column (1) indicates that individuals involved in
agriculture (Job_ag) are more likely to protest and oppose. However, its individual effects on
protesting or opposing alone are not significant (columns 2 and 3).
Not surprisingly, the probability of falling into any of the three groups, relative to the base
case, is negatively associated with education level (Educ) and agreement with the statement that
grazing should be managed for vegetation management priorities (dgrzveg). These variables are
statistically significant across all groups. Other variables seem to have differential effects on
protest and opposition probabilities. Those who engage more in outdoor activities (Activity) and
those who consider fire prevention as a priority (Pri_firpvt) are less likely to protest or oppose
the proposed land management programs (column 1). Employment in retail or wholesale trade
(Job_trade), the degree to which individuals believe wildhorses are a serious threat to rangelands
(Threat_wldhrse), and agreement with the statement that rangeland fires should be stopped only
when they threaten human life (dfiresupp) are positively and significantly associated with non-
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protester’s probability of opposing (column 2).

These variables likely reflect underlying

conflicts of respondents’ personal interests with the proposed program so that, while not
revealing protest beliefs, they are unwilling to pay for the program. In column (3) the negative
coefficient on Age suggests that a non-opposer’s probability of protesting decreases with age.
Employment in outdoor recreation and tourism (Job_recr) is negatively associated with the
probability of protesting for both opposers and non-opposers (columns 1 and 3).
Finally, in general, survey design variables (Vs, Vd, OG, and Info) all have a negative effect
on the probabilities of being in any of the three categories in Table 4. Relative to the multiplebounded versions (with 9 bid amounts presented), respondents with single or double bid versions
are less likely to oppose and protest. The effects from information provision (Info) and the
restoration version of the program (OG) are not significant, but the signs are persistently
negative on these coefficients. However, the coefficients on Vs and Vd likely reflect the spurious
relation between bid design and protest probability discussed in the previous section.
Overall, the multinomial logit results indicate that there are likely complex behavioral
motivations underlying the probabilities of being a protestor•opposer, a non-protestor•opposer, a
protester•non-opposer, and a non-protester•non-opposer. Different behavioral motivations may
carry through to different underlying distributions for WTP so that estimation of WTP without
testing for these differences would result in the wrong model. Moreover, the low pseudo R2
value (0.116) for the multinomial logit suggests that this model does not possess the predictive
power on protest/oppose probabilities that policy decision makers would like. For more accurate
probability predictions, it is desirable to fit different conditional models for protesters, nonprotesters, opposers, and non-opposers. For the purpose of the present paper, however, we point
out that conventional treatment of protester responses in willingness to pay estimation –

17

dropping groups (1) and (2) and pooling the rest – may be overly simplistic, and lead to loss of
information. We accommodate for these differences in estimation of WTP for the programs.
Willingness to Pay Estimation
Respondents who voted ‘definitely yes’ to support the program at zero cost were retained to
use in the valuation models to estimate WTP for the proposed programs to protect rangeland
ecosystems. In doing so, we measure conditional WTP (WTP|WTP ≥ 0). A random effects
probit was used to determine the probability of a ‘yes’ response, as described in Rollins et al.
(2008) and Boxall et al. (2003). An unbalanced panel was created with one observation per bid
amount for each individual. Thus, each respondent is represented by three to nine observations.
The overall model selection strategy was to include as many variables that are observable and
easily identifiable to policy makers as possible. This called for inclusion of more demographic
than attitudinal variables. Preliminary models (not presented here) showed that most attitudinal
variables had minimal effect on WTP estimates; the estimated WTP levels were extremely robust
to the choice of attitudinal variables to include in the model. Thus, we focus on demographic
and survey design variables that were included to test for robustness of WTP estimation. First, a
pooled model was used to perform a Chi-square test to determine whether protest and nonprotest models are statistically different. 2 The regression coefficients of our predictor variables
are constrained to be the same for protestors and non-protestors against unconstrained models.
The likelihood ratio chi-square test shows that the unconstrained models provide a significantly
better fit to the data (Table 5). The important implication is that the processes generating WTP
are different for protestors and non-protestors, so generalization to the population as a whole
cannot take place unless both group processes have been modeled.
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Table 5. Results of Likelihood-Ratio Test
Sample
Log likelihood
a
Pooled
-712.253
Protesters
-287.697
a
Non-protesters
-349.351
LR Chi2 (26)
144.26
2
Prob > Chi
0.000
a
Observations with missing protest information are included.
The model was then estimated for the pooled sample, protester subsample, and non-protester
subsample (Table 6). In models (4) and (6), the observations with missing protest information
were included as non-protesters. Because these observations were the only ones with ‘yes’ votes
to the highest bid ($282), omitting them from WTP estimation would result in a downward bias
in the estimates. Thus, we consider that model (6) gives the most reliable estimates of WTP for
the proposed rangeland protection programs. Note that model (4) would arise as the only WTP
model if the conventional protest definition was applied (a ‘no’ response to all bid levels and a
protest response indicated).
As expected, the mean WTP estimate for protesters ($34.02) indicated in model (5) is
substantially lower than that of model (6) for the non-protesters ($69.56). The explanatory
power of the independent variables on WTP for protestors is low; other than the bid amount and
income, none are statistically significant. We conjecture that those who expressed protest beliefs
likely evaluated, rather than a pure valuation of the ecosystem goods and services protected by
the proposed programs, a composite good that included program delivery by government,
funding via taxation, and other additional elements with negative connotations. The poor fit of
model (5) may indicate the necessity of alternative specifications that address these factors. The
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Table 6. Estimation Results for WTP model (Random Effects Probit)
(4)
Pooleda
Coeff
s.e.
0.016
0.008
0.132
0.001
0.028
1.496
2.599
0.865
1.161
1.443
2.391
1.665
1.181
1.972
0.930
1.468
1.844
2.521
1.857
1.910
0.938
1.508
1.144
1.317
1.167
0.926
3.378

(5)
Protester
Coeff
s.e.

Bid
Income
Age
Age2
Yrs_NV
Job_ag
Job_lndscp
Job_mine
Job_constr/mfn
Job_trade
Job_wtrmgnt
Job_othutil
Job_health
Job_nrsci
Job_ed
Job_ent
Job_recr
Job_publnds
Job_admin
Job_fire
Lrt
dmthd_prsgrz
Vs
Vd
OG
Info
cons

-0.104***
0.030***
0.181
-0.002
0.034
1.007
-4.665*
-0.956
-0.059
2.722*
0.622
-2.839*
-0.131
-1.993
-0.165
1.013
3.171*
2.325
0.130
-0.331
-1.229
1.387
-0.601
-1.016
-0.995
0.024
-1.074

WTP mean (s.e.)
WTP median
95% CI
K&R 95% CIb

54.828
(1.253)
52.782
(52.363, 57.293)
(48.76, 61.60)

34.020
(1.020)
33.751
(32.005, 36.035)
(29.12, 39.29)

75.704
(3.167)
69.561
(69.451, 81.956)
(67.00, 84.16)

Log likelihood
Observations
Respondents
Rho

-711.885
2281
325
0.968

-287.697
1157
153
0.894

-349.148
1124
172
0.975

0.010

-0.108***
0.012*
-0.064
0.001
0.012
-2.450
-3.441
-0.207
0.372
-0.422
1.872
-0.157
0.948
2.559
0.984
1.119
1.014

0.019
0.006
0.112
0.001
0.024
1.565
2.698
0.766
0.916
1.399
2.428
1.122
0.942
1.791
0.827
1.244
1.875

3.363
-0.364
-1.091
0.217
-0.677
-0.321
-0.061
0.087
2.695

2.136
1.707
0.957
1.002
1.075
1.040
0.888
0.723
2.870

(6)
Non-protestera
Coeff
s.e.

a

0.038

-0.102***
0.051***
0.465**
-0.005**
-0.049
2.137
-4.113
-1.494
1.671
6.768***
3.793
-9.512***
-1.557
-6.799***
-1.303
0.558
3.393
2.244
-5.428**
1.675
-2.588*
6.676**
-2.398
-3.814**
-4.859**
-1.478
-0.594

0.013
0.013
0.201
0.002
0.041
2.093
3.871
1.294
1.530
2.403
3.936
3.387
2.223
2.388
1.321
1.968
2.197
3.352
2.470
3.896
1.383
2.757
1.821
1.905
2.084
1.521
5.306

0.007

Observations with missing protest information are included.
b
Krinsky and Robb Confidence Intervals estimated using a Stata routine developed by Jeanty (2007).
Notes: Significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 are denoted by three, two, and one asterisks (***, **, *), respectively.
Job_publnds is dropped in model (5) due to collinearity.
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model under the conventional protest definition, model (4), also understates ($54.82) the pure
valuation of the ecosystem services to be protected.
Model (6), WTP for non-protesters, indicates that the probability of a ‘yes’ response is
decreasing in the bid amount and increasing in income, as expected. WTP is increasing with age
until age 49, after which it is decreasing. People who received the version of the questionnaire
with the restoration policy (OG) were less likely to vote ‘yes’ than those with the preservation
policy (PL). This is consistent with previous research that suggests people tend to be willing to
pay more to protect the status quo than they are to obtain a gain to the status quo. This result
may be important to consider more carefully in further work, since it would imply that the longer
policy-makers wait to implement policies to protect ecosystem services, there will be lower
public support for restoring additional degradation that might occur.
People who believe that prescribed grazing is not an appropriate tool for rangeland
management (dmthd_prsgrz) were more likely to vote ‘yes.’ Prescribed grazing was listed as
one of the ten means by which the proposed programs would reduce the spread of invasive
species and reduce wildfire frequency. However, prescribed grazing is controversial among
those who are generally skeptical of private ranching on public lands in the Great Basin. Thus,
the positive coefficients on dmthd_prsgrz may imply that those who are opposed to prescribed
grazing as a management method are willing to pay more to prevent ecosystem losses through
the other methods. This result also has direct policy relevance, as the choice of rangeland
management methods is a significant concern for the public land management authority.
While Table 4 results indicate that a respondent from a large rural town (Lrt) is less likely to
be a protester or an opposer, a non-protester•non-opposer from a large rural town tends to have a
lower WTP than the rest of the population (Table 6, model 6). The result confirms that the four
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groups used in the multinomial logit are indeed very different and that separate models are
warranted. Variable Lrt does not significantly affect protestors’ WTP.
The probability of voting ‘yes’ is positively associated with employment in wholesale or
retail trade (Job_trade) but negatively associated with employment in utilities other than water
(Job_othutil),

natural

resource

and

environmental

sciences

(Job_nrsci), and public

administration (Job_admin). These results may be associated with potential impacts of the
proposed policy on the regional economy through linkage effects across sectors.
Of the design variables other than OG, the additional information supplied (Info) did not
appear to affect the probability of a ‘yes’ response, nor was the effect of a single-bid amount (Vs)
relative to the multiple-bid amount (Vm) versions. However, relative to the respondents who
received the multiple-bid versions (Vm), the double version (Vd) appears to have a negative
influence on WTP. However, upon further investigation, these latter effects are spurious and
were inadvertently generated as a result of the experimental design described in Table 1 3 .
Conclusions
The willingness to pay estimation for protest respondents revealed that they do value
ecosystem services that would be protected under the proposed programs in this study.
However, the estimated WTP levels were substantially lower for protesters than for nonprotesters. In the case of programs to protect flows of ecological goods and services from
Nevada’s rangelands, the fact that over 86% of these lands are in public ownership makes it
difficult to suggest a credible stated-preference payment vehicle and policy-delivery mechanism
that does not include public sector involvement. The policies would necessarily be implemented
by public agencies and methods would comply with federal government regulatory requirements.
We expect that the general population from which the sample is drawn is well aware of this. For
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protester respondents, the good being valued may include features that are inseparable from the
policy implementation and the payment vehicle, both in the stated preference questionnaire as
well as in their understanding of the good as it exists in reality.
When the reality of the proposed policy is reflected in the stated preference payment vehicle
and policy implementation mechanism, we find it less compelling to treat traditional protest
beliefs as indicative of an outlier. Instead, we consider the possibility that in these cases a
protest belief is a legitimate part of individuals’ preferences and influences their understanding
of the definition of the good at hand. However, under these conditions, the data may represent
different definitions of the good being valued, and therefore different distributions for WTP.
To generalize beyond the current study, under what circumstances are the protest beliefs a
genuine reflection of the definition of the good as that portion of the population understand it? If
the components of a proposed policy that trigger protest beliefs are integral to the good as it
enters an individual’s utility function, then it is difficult to separate what part of WTP for
protesters is their valuation of ecosystem goods, and what part is due to how these ecosystems
are managed in order to provide flows of benefits. In cases like these, we suggest that both sets
of estimates, those for protestors and non-protestors, are informative for policy makers.
For many environmental goods, policy contexts are integral to people’s values for these
goods. Other circumstances in which environmental goods and the existing policy mechanisms
to deliver them are not separable include the impacts of global environmental goods for which
collective action is required to produce a desired public good benefit. Further work might
investigate whether it is possible to develop stated preference models in which structural
interactions between the environmental good and the mechanisms for its delivery and payment
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can be explicitly modeled, where these mechanisms are likely to be highly correlated with
pervasive protest beliefs.
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Appendix: Two Versions of Proposal
A. Proposal PL (Prevent Loss)
PROPOSAL
Suppose that experts predict the numbers of wildfires in Nevada to double over the next
five years due to the continued spread of cheatgrass. This will lead to the loss of native
grasses, wildflowers, and shrubs.
A new, intensive Rangeland Vegetation Management Program has been proposed. This
program will reduce fire risk by reducing cheatgrass through the use of prescribed fires,
machinery, herbicides, prescribed grazing, and seeding with native plants and non-native
grasses such as crested wheatgrass.
Under this new program, fire risk would not double, but stay the same as it is now.
Now suppose that the Rangeland Vegetation Management Program would be funded
through a new tax.
If a majority voted YES (for the proposal), a special tax would be collected from everyone
and used only for the Rangeland Vegetation Management Program.
If a majority voted NO (against the proposal), the tax would not be charged and the
management program would not be funded.
Please imagine that if the proposal passes, you would be charged the special tax every year
for the foreseeable future.
As you think about your answer, please remember that if this proposal passes, you would
have less money for other expenses.

B. Proposal OG (Obtain Gain)
PROPOSAL
Suppose that a new, intensive Rangeland Vegetation Management Program has been
proposed. This program will reduce fire risk by reducing cheatgrass through the use of
prescribed fires, machinery, herbicides, prescribed grazing, and seeding with native plants
and non-native grasses such as crested wheatgrass.
The new program could reduce the number of wildfires throughout the state by half.
Now suppose that the Rangeland Vegetation Management Program would be funded
through a new tax.
If a majority voted YES (for the proposal), a special tax would be collected from everyone
and used only for the Rangeland Vegetation Management Program.
If a majority voted NO (against the proposal), the tax would not be charged and the
management program would not be funded.
Please imagine that if the proposal passes, you would be charged the special tax every year
for the foreseeable future.
As you think about your answer, please remember that if this proposal passes, you would
have less money for other expenses.
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Notes
1

An analysis of respondents’ uncertainty about answers is forthcoming.

2

Those observations with missing protest information were included as non-protesters. Note

that these are the respondents who answered ‘definitely yes’ to all bid amounts.
3

Running the same models with only prevent loss (PL) policy versions indicated extremely high

P-values for the Vs and Vd coefficients. There is no bid structure variation for obtain gain (OG)
version. Running the model for both policy versions but without the Vs and Vd variables
indicates that the coefficient on OG remains significant and negative. Therefore, we attribute the
significance of Vd to the spurious correlation coming through the survey design, for which we
have been unable to control.
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